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Abstract 
 
To survive in a complex environment, agents must be able to encode information about the utility value of the 
objects they meet. We propose a neuroscience-based model aiming to explain how a new memory is associated 
to an emotional response. The same theoretical framework also explains the effects of emotion on memory re-
call. The originality of our approach is to postulate the presence of two central processing units (CPUs): one 
computing only emotional information, and the other mainly concerned with cognitive processing. The emo-
tional CPU, which is phylogenetically older, is assumed to modulate the cognitive CPU, which is more recent. 
The article first deals with the cognitive part of the model by highlighting the set of processes underlying mem-
ory recognition and storage. Then, building on this theoretical background, the emotional part highlights how 
the emotional response is computed and stored.  The last section describes the interplay between the cognitive 
and emotional systems. 
 
1   Introduction 
Intensive research in neuroscience has established a 
close link between emotion, cognition, and action. 
In recent years, researchers in artificial intelligence 
and robotics have attempted to build artificial sys-
tems where emotional and motivational mechanisms 
modulate cognitive mechanisms (e.g., Pfeifer & 
Scheier, 1999). However, these attempts have so far 
been directed at modelling animal behaviour and/or 
relatively simple tasks, and did not use current 
knowledge of the human brain. We suggest that, in 
order to understand how emotion, motivation, cog-
nition and action interact in complex systems it is 
necessary to use the information provided by current 
research in neuroscience.  
 
The aim of this paper is to propose a model linking 
emotion and cognition that is based on recent devel-
opments in neuroscience. In particular, we want to 
identify the learning and memory mechanisms that 
enable memories to be influenced by emotions. We 
also discuss how the proposed mechanisms relate to 
chunking, a mechanism that has been shown to be 
central to cognition from simple animals to human 
experts. While we do not present a computer or ro-
botic implementation of these mechanisms, we be-
lieve that they will be of interest to researchers 
building such implementations and others attending 
this symposium. In particular, we hope that the ideas 
presented in this theoretical paper will entice col-
leagues to build computer or robotic systems that 
will allow testing them empirically.  
 
The first section presents a model of memory proc-
essing. The model describes the mechanisms behind 
object recognition and storage, and spells out the 
role of the cognitive central processing unit (CPU). 
In the second section, we present a model of emo-
tional processing. The objective is to show how an 
affect is generated from recognised objects and to 
make clear the relation between the retrieval of 
stored information and that of emotional response. 
In this section, we also introduce the concept of an 
emotional CPU, which computes the emotional re-
sponse. Finally, we present an integrative model that 
consists of the two previous components. Thus, a 
direct link is made between memory storage and 
emotional processing. The interaction between the 
two CPUs is crucial, as it is the means by which the 
emotional responses are actually influencing cogni-
tive processing.  
 
2   The cognitive system 
2.1   Bottom-up processing 
The recognition of an object is done when a particu-
lar configuration of neurons coding for the object 
and its properties is activated. Such distributed neu-
ral networks, which activate a small number of 
modules concerned with different types of informa-
tion (spatial, auditory, etc…), are known as cell as-
semblies (Sakurai, 1999). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. A cell assembly (CA). Cells possibly lo-
cated in distinct parts of the brain are activated 
jointly.  
 
A cell assembly is distributed in distinct brain areas. 
The cells forming a cell assembly are closely inter-
connected (bold links in the Figure 1): the activation 
of a neuron belonging to the assembly is likely to 
activate the other neurons of the assembly. This 
propagation law makes the CA act as a unit: when a 
subpart of the CA is activated (e.g., the property of 
an object is recognised), the spreading activation is 
very likely to activate all the CA, so that the object 
is recognised even if some of the information is 
missing (e.g., when an object is partially hidden).  
 
As soon as an object is recognised, the neural coor-
dinates serve as a pointer for short-term memory 
(STM) storage. It is likely that top-down inhibitory 
control processes are carried out at this stage, speci-
fying whether or not the recognised object is of in-
terest and should accordingly be stored in STM. 
 
2.2   The functions of the cognitive CPU 
When a CA is activated (i.e., an object is recog-
nised), a pointer that codes for this CA is stored in 
STM. As each recognised object activates a CA, the 
role of the cognitive CPU is to compute an overall 
representation of the external milieu by connecting 
the active CAs. This computation is likely to have 
two main consequences: 
 
(i) To activate new pathways between the cell as-
semblies. 
(ii) To modify the dynamics within each cell assem-
bly. The spreading activation of any cell assembly is 
now an input for all others.  
 
The result of this computation is the emergence of a 
new dynamic neural network (DNN) that represents 
the external milieu. The DNN is maintained active 
by CPU processing. Unlike CAs, the DNN needs an 
active control to remain active. 
 
2.3   Consolidation: Long-term memory 
The question now arises as to how the DNN may be 
encoded more permanently. In line with this theo-
retical framework, long-term memory (LTM) storage 
refers to the processes that change the neural net-
work activity computed by the cognitive CPU into 
one consolidated memory trace. Neuroscience is 
bringing converging evidence supporting the view 
that the medial temporal lobe mediates information 
storage in the sensory cortices by generating struc-
tural changes via mechanisms like long-term poten-
tiation (Kandel, Schwartz, & Jessell, 2000). We 
suggest that, following the computation of a new 
DNN (see previous section), the CPU supervises its 
consolidation into durable memory traces. Such 
consolidation is done through the synthesis of new 
synapses consolidating the new connections (Kandel 
et al., 2000). As a result of the consolidation of 
memory traces, a new durable CA emerges, and thus 
a new object can be recognised. We note that the 
new CA encompasses the previous CAs coding for 
the individual objects. This process of building new 
patterns by accretion of previous ones is known as 
chunking (Gobet et al., 2001). 
 
Chronologically, the chain of reactions leading to 
the emergence of a new CA is initiated by bottom-
up processing which generates the recognition of 
objects. As soon as recognition is done, the CPU 
computes a dynamical network that represents the 
situation in STM. Thanks to the consolidation proc-
ess, the dynamical network evolves into a structural 
network. This leads to the emergence of a new cell 
assembly that could be activated by discrimination 
of entrant stimuli. 
 
So far, we have presented a theoretical framework 
for memory recognition and storage. The key com-
ponent is the cognitive CPU, the function of which 
is twofold: first, to compute the representation of the 
external milieu based on the recognised objects and, 
second, to consolidate the new computed representa-
tion in memory. In the next section, we turn our 
attention to emotional processing. 
 
3   The emotional system 
3.1   The functions of emotions 
The information processed by the cognitive system, 
although useful for survival, lacks any utility value. 
However, a living system needs to know the utility 
of the objects in the environment in relation to a 
given task. Emotions, which play this role, have 
been defined by Rolls (2003) as “states elicited by 
rewards and punishers” (p. 552). A reward is what a 
living system is ready to work for, and a punisher is 
what it tries to avoid. Emotions are thus goal-
directed, and values depend on the goal (the motiva-
tor). For example, when one is cooking, the goal is 
to prepare good food (motivator). Each element tak-
ing part in the action of cooking has its own utility  
(emotional value: reward or punisher). In general, 
emotions structure the environment by tagging ob-
jects with an emotional value relative to a goal (the 
motivator). The emotional physiological response 
consists in preparing the body for action (Frijda, 
1993). What remains to be spelled out is how the 
emotional system tags information from the envi-
ronment, and how this influences high-level cogni-
tive processes. 
 
 
3.2   Emotional processing 
A key issue in emotion research is how a neutral 
stimulus comes to generate emotional responses 
with experience. A good example from this field of 
research is LeDoux’s (2002) model of fear condi-
tioning, which links emotion and cognition in the 
simplest way: a stimulus, previously neutral to the 
animal, is paired to an emotional response.  This 
model of fear learning illustrates that emotional re-
sponses are stored, and that they can be linked to 
stored objects. As soon as the object is recognised, 
the emotional response is retrieved. Fear is an 
unlearned punisher, thus likely to be genetically 
coded (Rolls, 2003). But some emotions are experi-
ence-dependent and thus ontologically built. There-
fore, we need to provide an explanation of how new 
emotions are computed from previous emotional 
responses. This necessary flexibility suggests the 
existence of a system regulating emotional re-
sponses.   
 
A living system has thus to be able to process emo-
tions that do not induce automatic responses. In ad-
dition, different objects are likely to induce different 
emotions, giving rise to internal conflicts. To deal 
with these issues, we propose a model where three 
steps of information processing are postulated. In 
the first step, any recognised object in a scene acti-
vates its associated emotional response. In the sec-
ond step, the emotional CPU computes an overall 
emotional response in the same way as the cognitive 
CPU computes an overall representation. That is, the 
emotional responses are physiological levels that 
encode objects utility values; in order to integrate 
the emotional responses, the CPU sums the utilities 
of all objects. In the third and final step, the com-
puted emotion is felt by the individual as related to 
the representation of the external milieu.  
 
This model, which spells out how recognised ob-
jects can retrieve different emotions, explains how 
the living system generates new emotions based on 
the emotional responses of the recognised objects. 
But the living system also needs a way to combine 
the overall emotional response with the representa-
tion computed by the cognitive CPU. This issue is 
addressed in the next section. 
 
4   Cognition and emotion 
 
4.1   Empirical evidence on the influence 
of emotion 
There is substantial empirical evidence supporting a 
close relationship between the cognitive and emo-
tional systems, and two examples will suffice here. 
Erk et al. (2003) demonstrated that non-emotional 
objects are better encoded in memory when they 
have been associated to a strong enough emotional 
clue. That is, the emotional context modulates the 
encoding of memories with no prior emotional 
value. Kilpatrick and Cahill (2003) showed emo-
tionally loaded film clips to their participants, and, 
using neuroimaging techniques, showed that the 
amygdala, a brain structure related to emotional 
processing, influences the hippocampus, a brain 
structure related to memory consolidation.  
 
4.2   Emotion and memory storage and 
retrieval 
The emotional and cognitive processes are both par-
allel and serial (see Figure 2).  
 
 
Figure 2. The information flow: a summary 
 
In order to clarify them we divide the chain of ac-
tions in two steps. The first step is the computation 
of both the representation of the external milieu by 
the cognitive CPU, and the computation of the emo-
tional response by the emotional CPU. The second 
step, explains how the two CPUs cooperate in order 
to link and consolidate the dynamic neural network 
representing the external milieu to the computed 
emotional response. 
Figure 2 also describes the two processes that are 
running in parallel: one cognitive, the other emo-
tional. The cognitive process was explained in the 
first section of the paper. The emotional process is 
divided in two steps. Firstly, each active CA induces 
the retrieval of its associated emotional response 
(ER1, ER2, ER3). Secondly, the emotional CPU 
computes an overall emotional response (OER) by 
combining the retrieved emotional responses. The 
OER is the emotional utility value of the representa-
tion coded by the DNN. The OER is at the origin of 
the emotional influence of memory as it modulates 
the speed of the DNN consolidation: The more in-
tense the OER, the more facilitated the consolida-
tion of the DNN will be. In addition to this, the cog-
nitive CPU consolidates the link between the DNN 
and the EOR. As a result of this process, the DNN is 
associated to the computed emotional response. 
 
In summary, by means of the consolidation process, 
the cognitive CPU has created a new representation 
and has linked it to a new emotional response. When 
the representation is activated again in the future, 
the corresponding emotional response is retrieved. 
 
5   Conclusions 
The model provides an explanation of how recog-
nised objects generate a representation of the exter-
nal milieu and how this representation is turned into 
a structural feature of the system. In doing so, we 
put forward a biologically valid explanation for the 
influential concept of chunking (Gobet et al., 2001). 
The model also explains how emotional information 
is linked to objects stored in memory. Tagging al-
lows the system to retrieve the value of an object 
upon its recognition. The computations that follow 
ensure the necessary flexibility of high-level cogni-
tion. Both for memory and cognition, we have pos-
tulated that a CPU played a key role in controlling 
how cell assemblies are combined together so that 
they can be recognised as a unit in the future. 
 
Testing this theory will require a combination of 
empirical and theoretical research. That is, it will be 
necessary to develop computer programs or autono-
mous robots whose parameters will be set by both 
biological and psychological data. Then, experi-
ments should be run to test whether agents would 
perform better in complex and dynamic environ-
ments with the presence of the emotional mecha-
nisms described in this paper. If supported empiri-
cally, our theory would provide a powerful concep-
tual framework for computer science and robotics, 
as it would offer an explanation of how emotions 
help humans to structure their perceptual space. 
 
There is no doubt that understanding—and, in a 
computational model or robot, controlling—the dy-
namics of cell assembly raises serious theoretical 
and practical problems.  But then, the implicit mes-
sage of this paper is perhaps that complex process-
ing is necessary when emotions enter the scene and, 
in corollary, that there are limits in what simple 
autonomous agents can do without emotions modu-
lating the way they perceive and process informa-
tion. 
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